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ABSTRACT
Objective: To analyse implementation of the pilot study of the per capita system of 
healthcare financing in Ghana in 2012 for a determination of the likelihood of realising 
the inherent theoretical benefits when the system is rolled out nationally. 
Design and Setting: First, publicly available information on how the pilot unfolded is 
presented, followed by the reaction of the health authorities to these developments. 
We then analysed accrued evidence on costs and developments vis-à-vis the theoretical 
benefits. 
Results: It would appear that preparation for the pilot exercise could have been 
handled better. Concerns include i) the low level of both education and awareness 
of the capitation system among healthcare subscribers and primary care providers; 
ii) confusion about service provider to whom subscribers had been assigned for the 
capitation period; and iii) service providers not understanding differences between 
capitation financing and financing under the Ghana diagnostic Related Grouping; and 
iv) some indication of cost savings. 
Conclusion: Cost savings may be available nationally. This is important because cost 
containment is the driving force behind the introduction of the capitation system.
INTRODUCTION
This study analysed the pilot programme of the per 
capita system of healthcare financing in Ghana carried 
out in one political administrative region in 2012, 
with a view to identifying lessons that will stand the 
nation in good stead during the planned countrywide 
rollout of the system. Implementation of the capitation 
pilot was fraught with numerous challenges, many 
of them played out publicly. This study assesses this 
implementation using publicly available evidence. 
We address the question of whether there is some 
indication that the capitation system of financing 
healthcare will help address healthcare financing 
challenges as well as the chances of realising its 
expected benefits. 
 The National Health Insurance Authority (NHIA) 
was established “to secure the implementation of a 
national health insurance policy that ensures access 
to basic healthcare services to all residents”. To this 
end, the National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) 
was established “to provide finance to subsidise the 
cost of provision of healthcare services.” (1).  The 
NHIS is funded by i) 2.5% sales tax equivalent on 
goods and services eligible for value added tax; ii) 2.5 
percentage points out of 18.5% (of salaries) pension 
contributions on behalf of persons who belong to 
the national pension scheme; iii) premiums paid 
by non-members of the national pension scheme; 
iv) budgetary allocations made by government; v) 
grants and other donor support; and vi) earnings on 
investments made by the National Health Insurance 
Fund (NHIF). 
 NHIF pays for the cost of healthcare services for 
members of the NHIS. In 2011, the sales tax provided 
73% of NHIS revenues, deductions from pension 
contributions provided 17%, investment income 
generated 5%, premiums made up 4.5%, while other 
sources generated 0.5% (2). 
 For each of the years 2009, 2010 and 2011, NHIS 
expenditures exceeded revenues, reducing the NHIF 
to USD 152 million at the end of 2011. The NHIF 
started 2009 with USD 382 million (2). 
 Challenges facing the NHIS include fraud 
(double-billing, over-billing, non-adherence to 
tariff, irrational prescribing and poly-pharmacy, 
non-adherence to the Medicines List, poor quality 
care and unsupported claims) and anomalies 
(misapplication of funds, inability of the NHIS to 
account for monies collected, poor controls, conflict 
of interest, weaknesses in organizational processes as 
well as outright incompetence) as serious challenges 
facing the NHIS which needed urgent attention (3).
 To establish the NHIS and NHIA, the National 
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Health Insurance Act 650 was passed in 2003. Payment 
for claims for services provided under the NHIS 
started in 2005 using the fee-for-service approach. Not 
happy with the fee-for-service approach, the NHIA 
introduced Ghana Diagnosis Related Group (G-DRG) 
tariffs system for certain claims, while maintaining 
the itemized fee-for-service for others. 
 From the NHIA perspective, the fee-for-service 
system suffered from the fact that it rewarded 
service providers for providing services or items to 
subscribers even if they were not needed. In addition, 
this approach was said to be very tedious to use - it 
delayed submission of claims, payment of claims and 
consumed time and resources as the NHIS attempted 
to vet claims made. 
 Under the G-DRG, related diagnoses and 
procedures are grouped together and the average 
cost of treatment in that group determined. The 
G-DRG ensures uniformity in claims processing and 
claims management but could still be used to benefit 
the provider unnecessarily. Further, reimbursement 
procedures for services rendered by providers though 
somewhat simpler than the fee-for-service system, 
is administratively complicated and makes a heavy 
demand on the time of both the service provider and 
NHIA staff. Further still, there is some incentive for 
the provider to opt for a more expensive diagnosis 
or procedure, even if a less expensive one will do. 
The capitation pilot: In January 2011, the NHIA 
announced that service providers of the NHIS 
were to be pre-financed to provide services to 
subscribers of NHIS under a programme referred to 
as the "capitation system". A pilot study was to be 
undertaken before the system would be rolled-out 
nationwide.  Piloting got underway on 1st January, 
2012, and was to last between six and 12 months. It 
continued past 31st December, 2012.
 Under the pilot system, accredited healthcare 
providers were to receive advance payment monthly 
at a pre-determined fixed rate, to provide a defined 
package of services to subscribers registered with 
a provider. The capitation amount was initially 
envisaged to include pre and post-natal consultations, 
(delivery excluded), primary healthcare consultations 
at out-patient departments, medicines and routine 
laboratory and urine examinations. Subscribers 
would be allowed to voluntarily indicate their 
preferred primary-care provider (PPP). The PPP 
would then manage the primary healthcare needs 
of the clients. The capitation amount to be advanced 
to a PPP would be based on the number of clients 
who opted for that PPP. Once every six months, a 
subscriber could switch from one provider to another 
and payments will be redirected to the new PPP. 
Specialist referrals and in-patient care will continue 
to be paid for using the G-DRG. For the pilot study, 
the initial capitation rate was set at USD 1.03 per 
subscriber registered with a PPP per month.
Expected benefits of capitation to Ghana: Here is a 
summary of the advantages that adoption of a 
capitation system is supposed to confer on the 
healthcare system (4).
Table 1
Theoretical benefits of capitation (4).
1. Reduce the current massive administrative and staff time costs of claims preparation, submission, 
vetting and reimbursement involved in claims preparation, submission, vetting and reimbursement 
in using G-DRG; 
2. Simplify claims processing;
3. Improve cost containment; 
4. Control cost escalation by sharing financial risk between NHIS, providers and subscribers; 
5. Introduce managed competition for providers and choice for patients as a way of increasing the 
responsiveness of the health system; 
6. Improve efficiency through more rational use of resources; 
7. Correct some imbalances created by the G-DRG such as OPD supplier-induced demand where clients 
may be requested to make unnecessary visits because they are a condition for reimbursement under 
the G-DRG;
8. Address difficulties in forecasting and budgeting;
9. Other benefits to healthcare service providers include upfront payment as opposed to arrears, more 
predictable payment schedules, thus enhancing planning and encouraging stronger overall care 
management system. 
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Theoretical implications of capitation
Quality of care: Consider the extreme case of a 
private hospital which receives capitation money 
for members of a healthcare scheme for a period in 
question. Suppose that for this period, no member of 
the scheme uses the services of the hospital. The result 
would be that the hospital keeps all the capitation 
money it received. 
 Thus for this private hospital, every out-patient 
visit by a scheme member amounts to a reduction 
in money it could potentially keep for itself. All else 
equal, it makes sense for this hospital to reduce the 
resources spent on each patient. Such a hospital has a 
built in incentive to under-diagnose and under-treat 
patients to reduce costs. Of course, hospitals cannot 
ethically refuse to give subscribers appropriate care 
so as to keep the capitation payment. However, if 
patients do not get well, they will return to the service 
provider, probably frustrated.
Type of care: Healthcare providers who work under 
capitation programmes tend to focus on preventive 
healthcare. For, to them, it is financially more 
rewarding to keep clients from becoming ill than to 
treat them after they have become ill. Also, providers 
tend to shift away from performing expensive 
and newly developed treatment options that may 
have only a marginally higher success rate than 
alternatives. 
Provider as Insurer: In entering into agreement to 
provide healthcare under capitation arrangement, 
the healthcare provider is acting as an insurance 
company. The provider accepts fixed revenues 
(capitation amounts) but agrees to indemnify scheme 
members against unlimited claims in respect of 
ailments covered by their schemes over the period 
and to absorb the costs associated with clinical care. 
This means that the provider becomes the subscriber’s 
insurer. Given that the typical healthcare provider 
attends to few scheme members (relative to the 
typical insurance company), healthcare providers 
play the role of micro-health insurers, assuming the 
responsibility for managing the unknown future 
healthcare costs of their patients (5).
 Based on insurance principles (law of large 
numbers), large providers will tend to manage their 
health insurance risks better than smaller providers - 
better predictability of their costs, better preparedness 
for variations in service demand and costs and overall 
liquidity (6). It should be noted however that, even 
large providers are relatively inefficient risk managers 
compared with large insurance companies like the 
NHIS itself. 
 We note that Ghana is not the only country in 
search of an optimal system of healthcare financing 
that improves access and balances cost and quality 
of care. Many members of the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development continue 
to experiment with new methods of paying healthcare 
providers. For example, the concept, Pay-for-
Performance is used to provide incentives to increase 
the efficiency of primary care and specialist care 
physicians, (7). 
 Following this introduction, we present the 
methodology employed in conducting this study. 
Then we presented the results of our analysis followed 
by discussions  and concluding remarks.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
This assessment is conducted by evaluating evidence 
gathered during implementation of the pilot system 
against the theoretical benefits outlined by the NHIA 
in (4). The approach adopted in conducting this study 
involved a number of steps.
1. We gathered information on how the capitation 
pilot system evolved in the entire pilot region. 
Our sources included publicly available media 
reports, interviews conducted by the media with 
NHIA officials, NHIA press briefings (8), and 
National Health Insurance Scheme Reports, (2). 
We also used information available at the NHIA 
website.
2. Next, we reported on how the NHIA reacted to 
press reports about developments in the pilot 
programme;
3. Then, we analysed comparative claims data 
provided by the NHIA covering the periods 
January to June 2011 and January to June 2012 
at a press briefing held on October 2012;
4. Beyond claims data, we also discussed the 
evidence that accrued during the pilot study 
in respect of the other benefits that the NHIA 
expected adoption the capitation system would 
bring about (4);
5. We then highlighted the challenging issues 
that must be addressed in order to increase the 
chances of attaining the objectives of capitation.
LIMITATION
Granted that the pilot system was on-going for most 
of the time of writing, a full assessment of the pilot 
could not be made. For the same reason the NHIA 
has not, released any reports or data beyond press 
briefings referred to. However, our study is extremely 
worthwhile because it seeks to highlight challenges 
being faced and suggest ways to address same, given 
the importance of NHIS and the intended national 
rollout. On the ethical side, the author would have 
loved some feedback from the NHIA, but no official 
could be reached for authorised comment. However, 
this does not take away much from the study since 
it uses publicly available data. Opinions expressed 
must be considered those of the author.
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FINDINGS
How the pilot capitation evolved: The pilot study of 
the proposed capitation system began on January 1, 
2012. It was to last between six and 12 months and 
would cover all NHIS subscribers and all PPPs in the 
Ashanti Region. Choice of the Ashanti Region was 
justified on the grounds that, that region is typical 
of Ghanaian regions. The NHIA expected to face in 
this region challenges it could expect to face in other 
regions. The region is centrally located in the country, 
has a mix of rural and urban communities and has a 
representative blend of small and big heath facilities. 
17% of active NHIS subscribers nationally are in this 
region (2).  Overcoming challenges encountered in 
piloting the capitation in Ashanti would indeed 
position the NHIA to rollout the capitation system 
across the country with confidence.
 We document developments in respect of 
implementation of the capitation system:
 On January 6, 2012, the newspapers and radio 
stations carried news stories that the Society of Private 
Medical and Dental Practitioners (SPMDP) in the 
Ashanti Region had suspended their participation 
in the pilot study on the grounds that the capitation 
rate of USD 1.03 per patient per month for OPD 
primary healthcare (consultation, laboratory tests 
and medication but excluding child deliveries) was 
too small and that their businesses would collapse if 
they stayed with the capitation system. The SPMDP 
added that its members were not against the new 
system.
 Further, the SPMDP was of the view that since 
they had not signed any contract to operate under the 
capitation system, they would provide their services 
under the old G-DRG system.
 Later still in January, an advocacy group 
calling itself the Ashanti Development Union staged 
demonstrations in Kumasi (Regional capital) against 
the implementation of the capitation policy in the 
Ashanti Region for lack of effective public education.
 Then, on February 11, the newspapers carried 
stories that the SPMDP and the Ghana Registered 
Midwives Association (GRMA) in Ashanti had jointly 
issued a statement to the effect that members of the 
two groups had resolved to indefinitely suspend 
providing services to NHIS subscribers. As part of 
their concerns, their members wondered why the 
Ashanti Region was chosen for the pilot study.  They 
also complained that the capitation amount of USD 
1.03 was woefully below the USD 7.06 paid them per 
visit under G-DRG.
 Later, on February 15, the newspapers carried 
another story that teachers in Kumasi (Ghana National 
Association of Teachers) had called for suspension of 
the implementation of the capitation system ‘to save 
lives’. Concerns included members not finding their 
names at designated preferred primary-care providers 
(PPP) and being denied care. On the same day, the 
newspapers carried another story, that the NHIA 
had signed agreements with the SPMDP and GRMA 
under which both bodies would provide services 
under capitation while technical teams consisting 
of representatives of the two bodies and the NHIA 
would discuss issues of concern.
NHIA reaction to issues arising since the pilot study began: 
In response to the position of SPMDP on January 
6 to provide services under the G-DRG instead of 
capitation, the NHIA responded that since capitation 
was a product of the NHIS, it was binding on all who 
had been accredited by the NHIA to provide services 
under capitation. 
 In reaction to subscribers being turned away 
by PPPs because their names were not on the list of 
subscribers submitted to PPPs by the NHIA (hence 
their capitation amounts had not been directed to the 
affected PPPs), the NHIA issued a fiat that no PPP 
may turn away a subscriber on this account.
 Starting January 17, the NHIA commenced 
running full page advertisements in the daily 
newspapers titled UNDERSTANDING THE NHIS 
PROVIDER PAYMENT SYSTEM AND CAPITATION. 
In this advertisement, the NHIA sought to educate 
the public on the capitation system and to straighten 
out some misunderstandings.
 On February 3, the chief executive of the NHIA 
granted a radio interview during which he argued 
that comparison of the previous USD 7.06 per PPP 
visit to the capitation rate of USD 1.03 per subscriber 
per month was unfortunate. He explained that 
NHIA’s analysis of the history of the NHIS showed 
that subscribers visited healthcare facilities twice a 
year on average. This translates to USD 14.12 per 
subscriber per year. The current USD 1.03 a month 
per subscriber works out to USD 12.36 per year, just 
a little less than the USD 14.12 under the G-DRG. 
 Then starting February 7, the NHIA ran another 
series of full page advertisements in the daily papers 
this time titled 10 THINGS YOU NEED TO KNOW 
ABOUT NHIS CAPITATION. The aim was to further 
educate the public on capitation. 
 Later in February 2013, after much negotiation 
with service providers, the NHIA agreed to 
o Exclude antenatal and post-delivery care from 
the capitation rate; also 
o Payment for medication would revert to the 
itemised fee-for-service. 
 As a result, the capitation rates would now be:
o USD 0.35 per subscriber registered with 
government health institutions per month;
o USD 0.46 to members of the Christian Health 
Association of Ghana (owned by religious bodies 
but supported by government); and
o USD 0. 65 to SPMDP members and other private 
providers.
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The differential rates are due to differences in costs 
borne by government on behalf of PPPs. 
 Nevertheless, the agitation for higher capitation 
rate never receded. In March 2012, the NHIA 
announced increases in the capitation rates that would 
take retrospective effect to January 1, thus:
o from USD 0.35 to USD 0.58 for government health 
institutions;
o from USD 0.46 to USD 0.79 for members of the 
Christian Health Association of Ghana; and
o from USD 0.65 to USD 0.84 for SPMDP members 
and other private providers.
Analysis of capitation pilot evidence vis-a-vis stated 
potential benefits
NHIA Claim: Improving cost containment 
Evidence: As suggested in the introduction, cost 
containment appears to be the major reason for the 
introduction of capitation. Figure 1 shows monthly 
(January to June) movement in claims per active 
subscriber for 2011 and 2012. These charts which were 
presented by the NHIA chief executive in his press 
briefing in domestic currency have been presented 
in United States dollars for easy international 
comparison (8). What immediately stands out is that, 
of the four charts, the monthly averages in Ashanti 
during 2011 are highest. This is the period without 
capitation. 
 Next, one notices that the other three curves are 
bunched up – Ashanti 2012 with capitation, National 
2011 and National 2012 (both without capitation). One 
is curious that Ashanti 2012 with capitation is not 
lower than the other two. What is more, one wonders 
whether the May and June figures of Ashanti 2012 
suggest the beginning of a rising trend. 
Other NHIA Claims (Table 1): The following NHIA 
claims are addressed together because they have a 
lot in common.
(i) Capitation will reduce the current massive 
administrative and staff time costs of claims 
preparation, submission, vetting and reimbursement 
involved in using G-DRG and fee-for- services for 
medicines to pay for first line OPD care 
(ii) Simplifying claims processing.
(iii) Other benefits to healthcare service providers 
include upfront payment as opposed to arrears, 
more predictable payment schedules, thus enhancing 
planning
Evidence: The amount for the first month of capitation 
reached the PPPs in good time for the start of the pilot. 
Subsequently, minor delays resulted from interbank 
transactions. Indeed, claims processing has been 
simplified. However, because the lists of subscribers 
that went along with the capitation amounts to PPPs 
were inaccurate, the amounts PPPs received were not 
consistent with subscribers they were to serve each 
month. While the situation improved with time in 
the course of the pilot, it gave PPPs nightmares to the 
extent that some threatened to opt out of contracts 
with the NHIA. 
Figure 1
Average claim per active member (USD)
National refers to the national average excluding Ashanti Region.
Ashanti is the region in which capitation was piloted.
Note: Present values between 2011 and 2012 has been set aside to simply the exposition.
NHIA Claim: Sharing financial risk between the NHIA, 
PPPs and subscribers 
Evidence: NHIA had to revise the capitation rates 
upwards. The new rates reported above represent 
increases of 29% for SPMDP and private providers, 
70% for Christian Association members and 68% 
for government-owned providers. These increases 
were not planned for. The NHIA bears risk to the 
extent that the total capitation amount it pays may, 
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in providing healthcare. PPPs bear the risk that the 
cost of providing treatment to subscribers registered 
with them may, more often than not, exceed the total 
amount of capitation received. 
 PPPs are assuming the role of insurers, roles they 
are least prepared to play as discussed earlier. On the 
part of subscribers, if the capitation system is working 
well and is well funded (the system has government 
backing), subscribers do not bear financial risk as 
envisaged here.
NHIA Claim: Introducing managed competition for 
providers and choice for patients as a way of increasing 
the responsiveness of the health system 
Evidence: As the NHIA continued to address the 
teething problems of capitation, and PPPs became 
more comfortable with capitation, there were 
indication of some competition among PPPs to serve 
clients better. Clients were allowed by the NHIA to 
change PPPs (before six months were up) as a way of 
addressing concerns of unhappy subscribers.
NHIA Claim: Improving efficiency through more rational 
use of resources 
Comment: No evidence at this stage to assess this 
potential benefit.
NHIA Claim: Correct imbalances created by the G-DRG 
such as OPD supplier-induced demand
Evidence: Indeed, during the pilot, PPPs had no 
incentive to encourage multiple visits by subscribers. 
In fact, they had every incentive to discourage repeat 
visit.
NHIA Claim: Addressing difficulties in forecasting and 
budgeting 
Evidence: Data on OPD utilisation during the pilot 
is still being tallied. However, national data show 
clearly that overall OPD attendance has not at all 
stabilized (see year-on-year variations in Table 2. 
Confounding the picture for forecasting purposes is 
the wide regional variation in the number of active 
members as proportion of population. It ranges 
from 24.6% in 2011 in the Central Region to 50.9% in 
the Upper West Region (2). These differences must 
be borne in mind as the NHIA prepares to rollout 
capitation nationwide. 
Table 2
Annual variations in total OPD attendance by NHIS 
subscribers
Year OPD Cases % increase








Final piloting figures are not yet in hand. But available 
evidence suggests that the average claim per active 
member during the first six months of capitation 
was not lower than non-capitation claims. This is 
troubling on the surface. Part of the explanation may 
lie in the fact that even during the first six months of 
2011, when there was no capitation, average monthly 
claims in Ashanti were higher than the national 
average. With capitation, the savings in Ashanti hover 
around USD 1 per claim per month. The logic may 
be stretched to suggest that nationally too, the saving 
may be USD 1 per average monthly claim per active 
subscriber. Nationally, this would have translated to 
USD 25 million (USD 1 per 25,486,081 attendance), 
a substantial amount. The NHIA should however 
keep an eye on what appears to be a rising trend in 
Ashanti starting May 2012.
 The question of adequacy of capitation amount 
may be addressed by establishing objectively the cost 
of providing healthcare services. Admittedly, this is 
not a trivial exercise, but in Ghana, some work has 
been done in this direction (9 – 10). The NHIA may 
consider tackling this issue in the medium term. For, 
beyond agitating for higher capitation rates if the PPP 
consider that the capitation rate is low, they may be 
tempted to provide lower quality and cheaper care. 
This of course, raises ethical and other concerns, but 
is a possibility. 
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 The need for adequate education is paramount. 
It would help address confusion about:
• providers mixing up the underlying concepts 
of payments: G-DRG versus capitation;
• which PPPS subscribers were enrolled with, 
or whether they were enrolled at all is another 
bottleneck that must be addressed. Without 
doubt, NHIA must literally ensure that every 
single subscriber indicates their preferred PPPs. 
Meanwhile, NHIA must also ensure that PPP are 
not overburdened since this has the potential of 
causing disaffection among subscribers as waiting 
times increase and service quality falls since PPPs 
will try to stretch their resources to serve all. This 
situation is a two-edged sword however. Putting a 
limit on the number of subscribers per PPP, dilutes 
the intended advantage of introducing managed 
competition among providers. By capping the number 
of subscribers per PPP even those PPPs not pulling 
their weights may end up with subscribers, at least 
for the next six months. 
 Table 3 summarises our assessment of the 
evidence that accrued against the theoretical benefits 
of capitation system to deliver advantages to the three 
stakeholders relative to the G-DRG. We conclude 
that overall the pilot study was fraught with many 
challenges. On balance however, the outcome of the 
capitation appears to have favoured the NHIA more 
in financial terms than service providers. However, 
the NHIA’s image has taken a beating. It will have 
to act with more circumspection to win back public 
confidence before proceeding with the planned 
national rollout of the capitation system if they are 
to carry the public along. Benefits to subscribers are 
potentially large but indirect. They will be realized 
when the healthcare delivery system improves as a 
result of capitation. 
Table 3
Summary of evidence and our assessment of extent to which the pilot study has revealed benefits of the capitation 
system to stakeholders relative to the Ghana Diagnostic Related Grouping.
NHIA indicated* IMPACT ON STAKEHOLDER
Benefit NHIA/NHIS PROVIDER (PPP) SUBSCRIBER
1.Reduce  
administrative 
and staff time 
costs of claims 
preparation
Substantial confusion. 
Subscriber numbers per PPP 
were inaccurate resulting 
in massive discrepancies in 
amounts transferred versus 
what should have been 
Same as for NHIA/NHIS Lots of headaches for 
many whose names 
were not found with 
preferred PPP. NHIA 
had to issue a fiat that 
they could go to ANY 




Yes, once numbers of 
subscribers were agreed





Some indication to that effect Many complained that 
capitation rates are too low
Not an issue.
4.Control cost by 
sharing financial 
risk
Some positive evidence Pilot did not provide 







Some positive evidence noted 
towards the end of pilot




No evidence No evidence Many disagreed
7.Correct 
imbalances 
created by the 
G-DRG 
Yes Yes Not applicable





On the contrary. Pilot was 
rather chaotic
Same as for NHIA/NHIS Chaos in conduct of 







Yes, but were grossly 
inconsistent with subscriber 
numbers registered with 
PPPs
Same as for NHIA/NHIS Not an issue
Source: Author’s analysis of publicly available information.
* See Table 1. 
This study suggests that the following should be 
undertaken before NHIA embarks on a nationwide 
rollout of the capitation system:
1. NHIA should seek answers to why the average 
monthly claim in Ashanti appears to be rising as 
the capitation pilot appears to be taking hold. 
2. The NHIA should work closely with service 
providers in respect of revisions to the capitation 
rate to avoid public wrangling over appropriate 
rates. 
3. Before national rollout, PPPs need to understand 
how capitation is supposed to work financially. 
Subscribers must understand the need to register 
for a PPP and the reasons for being asked to 
prioritise three PPPs. Education should also 
focus on getting providers to appreciate the 
conceptual differences between fee-for-service 
and capitation.
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